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Abstract 
 
The agency problem of listed companies in East Asia is closely related to 
their typically concentrated ownership structures. Tight control creates an 
entrenchment problem that allows the controlling owners' self-interested 
behaviors to go unchallenged internally by the boards of directors or 
externally by takeover markets. The primary objective of this paper is to 
explore the association between the ownership and control structure and 
innovation. The ownership and control structure is measured first as the 
divergence between the ultimate owner's voting rights and the ultimate 
owner's cash flow rights, and second by the presence of ultimately 
controlling shareholder's family member as CEO or Chairman of the 
board, or both. Innovation is measured by patent quantity and patent 
quality. This paper uses patents granted by the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO) to measure innovation activities. We find that innovation 
is significantly and negatively related to the level of agency problems. We 
further find that innovation is lower for firms whose controlling owner is 
also either the chief executive officer or the chair of the board of directors. 
Our findings appear to be robust with respect to examining patent count 
and patent quality variables. 
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